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Summary: The consecutive financial crises have made the analysis of the systemic risks of financial institutions increasingly 
important worldwide. The researches so far have been primarily focusing on the banking sector, but insurance companies have 
also been given an increasing attention. Based on past literature, systematic risk can be measured in a variety of ways, and one 
of the options is the calculation of the indicators typical of return comovement. This study compares the dimensions calculated 
by the multidimensional scaling of returns in the banking and insurance sector. The results suggest that return dimensions in 
the Hungarian banking and insurance sector (related to systemic risk) are not completely independent, and, compared to the 
banking sector, the return comovement related systemic risk is lower in the insurance sector.1
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The objective of this study is to contribute to 
the extensive literature on systemic risk by an-
alysing the Hungarian banking and insurance 
data. systemic risk has a variety of definitions 
(eling-Pankoke, 2014), the scope of the in-
dicators is, therefore, very wide (Giglio et al., 
2016; ellis et al., 2014; eling-Pankoke, 2014; 
Kleinow et al., 2017; sedunov, 2016). Accord-
ing to the definition used in the study (simi-
larly to the approach described by Billio et al., 
2010), the point of systemic risk is the sim-
ilarity of different institutions, which can be 
measured by a principal component analysis. 
Kritzman et al. (2011) call the systemic risk in-
dicator calculated based on the result of the 
principal component analysis absorption ratio. 
The absorption ratio is defined by Kritzman et 
al. (2011) as the indicator of what part of the 
total variance of a given set of assets is account-
ed for (‘absorbed’) by some eigenvectors. Kritz-
man et al. (2011) determine that the greater 
value of the absorption ratio corresponds to 
a higher level of systemic risk, because in this 
case the sources of the risk are more uniform. 
in this study we compare the banking and in-
surance systemic risks based on indicators sim-
ilar to this absorption ratio. This indicator 
measures the effect of structural and cyclical 
systemic risks, also distinguished by the MNB 
(2018a), together, but based on the related cal-
culations, it might theoretically be possible to 
separate the two types of systemic risk. 
in this study, we use the method of mul-
tidimensional scaling instead of the principal 
component analysis belonging to the absorp-E-mail address:  borbala.szule@uni-corvinus.hu
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tion ratio. The reason for this is that from a 
methodological aspect multidimensional scal-
ing is more adequate in the case of the availa-
ble data. in the case of the Hungarian banking 
and insurance sector, no stock-market data are 
available on daily returns covering most of the 
sectors; return data concerning the sectors as 
a whole can only be calculated from account-
ing balance sheet and profit and loss statement 
data, the number thereof is, however, not suf-
ficient to appropriately carry out the principal 
component analysis. However, the results of 
multidimensional scaling and principal com-
ponent analysis are sometimes, theoretical-
ly, the same (Bécavin et al., 2011); the results 
of the two methods can be directly produced 
from each other if certain conditions are met 
(Kovács, 2014; 226.). On this basis, we use the 
interval measurement model of multidimen-
sional scaling in this study, where, similarly to 
the principal component analysis, eigenvec-
tors can also be calculated, which can be in-
terpreted as return dimensions in this analysis. 
The analysis strives to take into account the 
data of the banking and insurance sector as 
fully as possible, so the analysis is founded on 
the available data of the banking and insur-
ance balance sheets and profit and loss state-
ments between 2003 and 2015 (downloada-
ble from the website of the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank). The analysis includes the data of 16 
banks and 17 insurance corporations (insti-
tutions in the case of which there were data 
available for the entire period covered by the 
analysis, and the average return on equity was 
not a negative value). in 2015, within the con-
solidated balance sheet total the total amount 
of the balance sheet totals of the institutions 
included in the analysis amounted to 63.22 
percent in the banking sector and 79.44 per-
cent in the insurance sector. 
The study primarily would like to contrib-
ute to the literature by comparing the Hun-
garian banking and insurance systemic risk 
(measured based on the similarity of the re-
turn dimensions), in which literature it is still 
relatively rare to compare the two sectors from 
a systemic risk aspect. The analysis of insur-
ance activity separately from the banks is be-
coming more and more important nowadays, 
as the activity of the non-bank financial inter-
mediaries can lead to the growth of systemic 
risks as a result of a variety of impacts (MNB, 
2018b), partly because (based on empirical re-
sults) a causal relationship can be assumed be-
tween insurance activity and economic growth 
(Arena, 2008). The comparison of the insur-
ance and banking sector may mean interesting 
results for the macroprudential supervision as 
well, since, theoretically, the macroprudential 
policy tools affecting the whole financial in-
termediary system primarily affect the banking 
sector in practice (Kálmán, 2016), and they 
deal with the expansion possibilities of the 
macroprudential regulatory framework system 
of insurance corporations at both global and 
european level (MNB, 2018b). 
When comparing the two sectors, in addition 
to using the Hungarian data, the study also anal-
yses the value of correlations between the return 
dimensions, which is also still not frequent; the 
results calculated with Hungarian data can be 
considered as a novelty in the literature. 
The next, 2nd part of the study provides an 
overview of the systemic risk indicators com-
monly mentioned in the literature. The 3rd 
part is about the comparison of the banking 
and insurance systemic risk, and the 4th part 
contains the new empirical results of the study. 
The conclusions of the study are summarised 
in the 5th part.  
THe measuremenT of sysTemic risk
Financial stability is important for the en-
tire economy, but it does not have a uniform-
ly used definition in the literature, it is more 
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common to define financial instability (Baur, 
schulze, 2009). systemic risk is an associat-
ed concept, but it does not have a uniformly 
used definition in the literature either (eling, 
Pankoke, 2014). in the case of definitions, it 
is theoretically easy to distinguish, for exam-
ple, the term of risk (which can be analysed 
by statistical methods) and uncertainty (which 
cannot be identified by statistical methods) 
(Medvegyev, 2011), but risk is a term which 
cannot be directly measured (latent) in a sta-
tistical sense (Kovács, 2011), so practically, we 
can strive to measure the different aspects of 
risk at best. it is also typical in the case of sys-
temic risk, the complexity of which is shown 
by the fact that in europe, based on certain 
data, even its connection with the return on 
sovereign debt can be demonstrated (Pagano, 
sedunov, 2016). 
in the measurement of systemic risk a mac-
ro and a micro approach can be distinguished: 
the macroprudential indicators assess system-
ic risk at the level of the entire economy, while 
the microprudential indicators can be quan-
tified in relation to each institution (eling, 
Pankoke, 2014). in the european union it is 
the european systemic Risk Board that ful-
fils the macroprudential financial supervision, 
and the european supervisory authorities are 
responsible for the microprudential supervi-
sion (szegedi, 2012). in their study de Bandt 
and Hartmann (2000) distinguish the hor-
izontal aspect of systemic risk, within which 
the analysis only focuses on the financial sec-
tor, and the vertical aspect, which takes into 
consideration the impact on the economic 
output as well in the analysis of systemic risk. 
in the case of systemic risk, furthermore, we 
can distinguish cyclical and structural system-
ic risks: the source of cyclical systemic risk is 
the willingness to take risks, which is comov-
ing but also differing from the optimum lev-
el in a certain direction, while structural sys-
temic risk corresponds to the structure of the 
network between the different financial play-
ers (MNB, 2018a). Theoretically, financial sta-
bility risks can also be reduced with monetary 
policy and macroprudential policy tools, the 
prevention of the emergence of a system-lev-
el crisis can be considered as the primary task 
of macroprudential policy (Fáykiss, szombati, 
2013). Prior to the financial crises, the cyclical 
changes of systemic risk is shown, for exam-
ple, by the rate of total debts compared to the 
GdP („Basel gap”) (Lang et al., 2019), and the 
risks arising from the features of the banking 
networks can be calculated in different ways 
(for example Lublóy, 2005). in alignment with 
the different types of systemic risk the macro-
prudential tools include the countercyclical 
capital buffer as well as the structural systemic 
risk buffer (Kálmán, 2016).
According to the empirical results of Weiß 
et al. (2014) the global systemic risk is primar-
ily influenced by the characteristics of the su-
pervisory system, and the permanent impact 
of certain characteristics of the banks (for ex-
ample, their credit portfolio quality) is not jus-
tified by the empirical results. in the europe-
an union the european systemic Risk Board 
(esRB) was established in 2010, and its ob-
jectives include the prevention and mitigation 
of systemic risk. The banking sector of sever-
al european countries has systemic risk capital 
buffer (systemic risk buffer) in order to mitigate 
systemic risks. The international Association 
of insurance supervisors (iAis) also deals with 
the development of the activity-based evalu-
ation methods of systemic risks in the insur-
ance sector (eCB, 2017;133.). Gauthier et al. 
(2012) carried out calculations based on the 
data of Canadian banks in order to find out 
what impacts the application of systemic risk 
based macroprudential capital requirement 
might have on the banking sector. They de-
fined macroprudential capital requirement as 
a fix point, in the case of which the capital re-
quirement of each bank conforms to their con-
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tribution of the risk of the entire system (in 
the case of the recommended capital require-
ment). On the basis of their empirical results, 
the application of this systemic risk-based capi-
tal requirement reduced the likelihood of indi-
vidual bank failure as well as the likelihood of 
a system-level crisis by approximately 25 per-
cent. This result was calculated by Gauthier et 
al. (2012) by a network-based structural mod-
el. The network-based modelling approach has 
spread in the systemic risk literature over the 
last years (for example de souza et al., 2016; 
Huang et al., 2016; Hu et al., 2015; Balog et 
al., 2012; Csóka and Kiss, 2015). such ex-
pansion of the literature allows a more precise 
modelling of systemic risk, since the represent-
ative banking hypothesis used in the tradition-
al theoretical approach about bank regulation 
does not take into consideration, among oth-
er things, that in the general equilibrium the 
investment decision of each bank can theoret-
ically have an external impact on the results of 
the other banks, thus, also on their investment 
decisions (Acharya, 2009). 
The variety of the impacts of financial in-
stitutions exercised on each other also con-
tributes to the fact that the range of system-
ic risk indicators is extremely wide. Eling and 
Pankoke (2014) identified three important def-
inition elements following the review of the 26 
definitions of systemic risk:
•	the occurrence of some event (for exam-
ple, the bankruptcy of the financial insti-
tution, the development of a shock affect-
ing the economy as a whole, etc.);
•	the impact of the event (most of the def-
initions determine the consequences of 
the occurrence of the event, for example, 
that the event adversely influences the real 
economy);
•	causal connection (some definitions high-
light the causal connection, when it con-
siders a given risk as systemic risk). 
in connection with the banking system-
ic risk de Souza et al. (2016) identified some 
channels through which the risks may spread 
between the institutions:
•	risk concentration channel, when a large 
part of the banks are exposed to a com-
mon risk factor,
•	contagion channel through balance sheet, 
•	contagion transmitted by the prices, for 
example, when an asset needs to be sold 
quickly („asset fire sales”),
•	the development of illiquidity spirals. 
The range of systemic risk indicators is very 
wide: indicators which can be defined in many 
different ways have spread in the theoretical 
model construction, and several different in-
dicators have spread in the practical calcula-
tions, too. Giglio et al. (2016) classifies a cou-
ple of systemic risk indicators applied more 
commonly in the following groups: 
•	indicators measuring institution specif-
ic risk, which measure the contribution 
or sensitivity of an institution towards the 
systemic risk measured at the level of the 
overall economy; they include, for exam-
ple, the ΔCoVaR defined by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2008), which is the differ-
ence of the conditional (financial) system-
level VaRs measured by assuming the fi-
nancial institution to be in a distressed 
state and to be in a median state;
•	indicators with comovement and conta-
gion focus, which measure the connection 
between the share returns of financial in-
stitutions, including, for example, the ab-
sorption ratio also mentioned by Kritz-
man et al. (2011), which measures what 
proportion from the variance of the finan-
cial system is accounted for by the first few 
principal components;
•	volatility and instability indicators (which 
can, for example, be calculated from the 
average of the share volatility of the finan-
cial institution);
•	liquidity and credit indicators; 
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•	other indicators (for example, the indica-
tors associated with the relationships be-
tween financial institutions, the values re-
lating to the inter-bank credits, etc.). 
The cumbersomeness of the grouping of 
systemic risk indicators is shown by the fact 
that numerous indicators do not fit well the 
four categories (apart from the ‘miscellaneous’ 
category) presented by Giglio et al. (2016); the 
indicator applied by Huang et al. (2009) can 
be considered as such a category, which meas-
ures systemic risk by the theoretical price of 
the insurance against financial difficulties (a 
kind of risk-based deposit insurance). Over-
all, it can be stated that the different aspects 
of systemic risk are not easy to separate even 
theoretically. Raffestin (2014) stated, for exam-
ple, that portfolio diversification (for example 
in the assets of a bank) may, on the one hand, 
mean greater individual security, on the oth-
er hand, relationships are established between 
the investors by holding identical assets, which 
results in the formation of a kind of ‘endog-
enous covariance’ and also contributes to the 
systemic risk. 
The covariance and correlation between re-
turns is given an important role in the litera-
ture about systemic risk measurement. in his 
theoretical model Acharya (2009) measures 
systemic risk by the value of the correlation re-
lating to the returns of the assets held by the 
banks, selected in an endogenous manner. in 
his theoretical model, by analysing the choice 
of portfolio by the banks, Wagner (2009) pre-
sents that when the external impacts of bank 
failure depend on the overall condition of the 
banking sector, a lower correlation at the banks 
is not necessarily more advantageous from the 
aspect of the financial system as a whole. 
The systemic risk indicators measuring the 
comovement of returns have also spread in 
practical calculations. Civitarese (2016) pri-
marily deals with characteristics of the ab-
sorption ratio, eigenvalue entropy and index 
Cohesion Force from the few systemic risk in-
dicators based on return correlations:
•	index Cohesion Force is the ratio of the 
average correlation calculated based on 
daily returns and the average partial corre-
lation (the index calculates by filtering the 
impact of returns);
•	the absorption ratio also described by 
Kritzman et al. (2011) can be calculat-
ed by the eigenvalue-eigenvector decom-
position of the covariance matrix of the 
returns, and can be interpreted as total 
variance proportion explained by high ei-
genvalues;
•	eigenvalue entropy can be calculated on 
the basis of the eigenvalue-eigenvector (or 
singular value) decomposition of the cor-
relation matrix. 
THe sysTemic risk Differences  
of financial secTors
The traditional players of the financial inter-
mediary system are the (commercial) banks, 
one of the principal activities of which is the 
acceptance of deposits and lending. An impor-
tant source of the risks typical of the function-
ing is that the maturity of the deposits is usual-
ly shorter than that of the loans. The problems 
of each bank may constitute a system-level 
risk, as the financial problems of the banks in-
terlinked through the network of mutual pay-
ments, among other things, may spread to 
other banks, too. New sources of systemic risk 
developed by the spreading of modern finan-
cial services; for example, by the development 
of financial groups, theoretically, even the fi-
nancial problems of insurance companies may 
spread to the banking sector. The rate of sys-
temic risk is, however, not necessarily identi-
cal in the different sectors; the rate of systemic 
risk may be influenced by the size of the given 
sectors. in Hungary, the assets calculated from 
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the consolidated balance sheet of credit insti-
tutions at the end of the third quarter of 2018 
was approximately 13.8 times the total assets 
included in the statistical balance sheet of the 
insurance companies. Figure 1 shows the tem-
poral evolution of these two values 
it is clear from Figure 1 that the systemic 
risk effect of the insurance companies in the 
Hungarian financial sector may currently be 
lower, partly as a result of the size of the sec-
tor, compared to the banking sector; howev-
er, this statement can be phrased more precise-
ly based on each institutional data. in the case 
of the differences in the sizes of each sector, 
it must also be considered that the size pro-
portions may change in the longer term: at 
the same time (at the end of the third quarter 
of 2018) in some countries of the european 
union the ratio of the assets of credit institu-
tions and insurance corporations had variable 
values, as shown by Figure 2. The indicators 
which can be interpreted similarly to the Hun-
garian data (which is approximately 13.8) in-
clude values over 20 as well as values below 
3. The lowest value was 1.76 in ireland, and 
the French (2.95), Belgian (3.15) and German 
(3.5) values are also relatively low. The rela-
tive size of the insurance and banking sector 
may be influenced by many factors, for exam-
ple, the consumption of life insurance prod-
ucts may correspond to cultural factors (Chui, 
Kwok, 2008), and according to an empirical 
analysis the most robust explanatory factors 
of the use of life insurances include, for ex-
ample, the development level of the banking 
sector, inflation and income per capita (Beck, 
Webb, 2003). As the economy develops and 
insurance products spread, the ratio of the in-
Figure 1
ToTal asseTs in The secTors (hUF billion)
Source: www.mnb.hu/statisztika/statisztikai-adatok-informaciok/adatok-idosorok/x-monetaris-es-egyeb-merlegstatisztikak)
credit institutions
Hu
f 
Bi
lli
on
insurance corporations
 studies 
266  Public Finance Quarterly  2019/2
surance sector measured in comparison with 
the banking sector may increase in Hungary, 
which also supports the importance of system-
ic risk researches conducted in the insurance 
sector. 
When comparing the financial sectors, it 
is important to precisely define the systemic 
risk indicator. in the comparison of the sys-
temic risks of the banking and insurance sec-
tor the past literature often focused on the po-
tential impacts of the ‘infections’. This is an 
important direction for the researches, and in 
this respect the literature often includes the 
statement that the systemic risk of the tradi-
tional insurance activity is lower compared to 
the activity of the banks (Kessler, 2013; tri-
chet, 2005; eling-Pankoke, 2014). One of the 
main related theoretical arguments is that in 
the case of insurance corporations, there is not 
as high a level of institutional interconnection 
as the one observed in the inter-bank market 
and in the operation of the payment system 
(Thimann, 2014). The systemic risk of banks 
can be largely influenced by the inter-bank 
network of relationships, the maturity trans-
formation combined with leverage, the pres-
ence of liquidity risk and the operation of the 
payment system (Thimann, 2014). These fac-
tors are not typical in the traditional insurance 
market, so it can be assumed that the system-
ic risk of insurance corporations differs from 
that of the banks.
The spreading of the ‘infections’ corre-
sponding to the institutional insolvency 
through the relationships between insurance 
corporations and reinsurance corporations 
could theoretically be possible by reinsurance 
(Morrison, 2003); however, the insolvency of 
Figure 2
raTio oF The asseTs oF crediT insTiTUTions and insUrance corporaTions
Source: european central Bank, http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/ and own calculations
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a reinsurance corporation is not likely to have 
sector-level impacts in particular, but rath-
er institutional impacts (esRB, 2015). Based 
on the esRB (2015, p. 14–17), the system-
ic risk impact of insurance corporations (on 
the financial system or the real economy) may 
arise from the participation in non-traditional, 
non-insurance activities (for example, the un-
dertaking of certain types of guarantee), from 
the procyclicality potentially appearing in as-
set allocation, from the procyclicality observed 
in the rate setting of insurances and, for ex-
ample, from the combined exposure to inter-
est rate risk.
Compared to the banking sector, there is 
also a difference in terms of the emergence of 
institutional insolvency in the insurance sec-
tor (and in any potential ‘infectious’ impacts 
thereof ), since the clients of the banks can, in 
theory, immediately take out the fixed-term 
deposits from the bank, while in the case of 
insurances, the procedure of repurchases re-
lating to contracts, with similar effect may be 
much slower, and the administrative costs as-
sociated with the procedure might hold back 
the customers from repurchasing the contracts 
(Morrison, 2003). The practical experience re-
lating to financial crises suggest that the meas-
urement of systemic risk is important in the 
case of the insurance sector as well (Arnold et 
al., 2012); the iAis (international Association 
of insurance supervisors) also deals with the 
possibilities of the activity-based evaluation of 
systemic risk in the case of insurance corpora-
tions (eCB, 2017, p. 133). 
The empirical results relating to the topic 
do not clearly demonstrate the lower systemic 
risk of the insurance sector, the comparison of 
the (precisely defined) components of the in-
surance and banking systemic risk can, there-
fore, be seen as a current issue. When com-
paring the ΔCoVaR (Adrian, Brunnermeier, 
2008) type systemic risk indicators of the 
banking sector, the insurance sector and oth-
er financial services sector, Bernal et al. (2014) 
determined that all the three financial sectors 
significantly contributed to systemic risk in 
the case of both the euro zone and the usA. 
By using data from between 2004 and 2012 
for the analysis, Bernal et al. (2014) also found 
that in the euro zone the other financial servic-
es sector and the banking sector made a larger 
systemic risk contribution than the insurance 
sector, while in the case of the usA, the insur-
ance sector made the largest systemic risk con-
tribution in the same period. 
meTHoDoloGical overview  
anD emPirical resulTs
The literature of systemic risk mentions nu-
merous different indicators, and from the dif-
ferent approaches an outstanding number of 
indicators are linked to network theory and 
return comovement. These two measurement 
approaches can be considered to be the same 
from a certain point of view, as, theoretical-
ly, network theory may contribute to the ex-
planation of return comovements. in the next 
part, though, we will not discuss the theoreti-
cal differences between the two types of meas-
urement approaches, but we will only inter-
pret the results of the calculations carried out 
similarly to one of the selected indicators. 
This selected indicator is the absorption ratio, 
which, based on Kritzman et al. (2011), can 
be determined by taking into account the ei-
genvalues calculated as the result of a principal 
component analysis. in mathematics, for ex-
ample, eigenvalues can be interpreted in con-
nection with the spectral decomposition the-
orem of symmetrical matrix, if, for example, 
there is a symmetrical matrix M, then, based 
on the spectral decomposition theorem, there 
is an orthonormal base belonging to matrix 
M (which contains the eigenvectors of matrix 
M), in which matrix M is diagonal, and the ei-
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genvalues will be found in the main diagonal 
of the diagonal matrix (Medvegyev, 2002, p. 
454). in the principal component analysis, the 
coordinates of components can be calculated 
based on the eigenvectors of the correlation or 
covariance matrix, and the eigenvalues show 
the variances of the components. if relatively 
few components are needed for the eigenval-
ues belonging to them to account for the ma-
jority of the total variances, this suggests that 
the correlation values are relatively large in ab-
solute value. if the correlation values refer to 
returns, the comovement of the returns can be 
measured with the eigenvalues which can be 
calculated in the principal component analy-
sis, as, it was written by, for example, Kritz-
man et al. (2011). 
Kritzman et al. (2011) defined the absorp-
tion ratio as the ratio of the sum of the first 
few eigenvalues and the sum of the total ei-
genvalues in an analysis which includes the 
covariance matrix of the asset returns. Kritz-
man et al. (2011) states that a larger value of 
the absorption ratio corresponds to a higher-
level systemic risk, because the situation sug-
gests that the sources of the risk are more uni-
form. 
The fact that stock-market data, which 
would provide basis for the calculation of daily 
returns, are only available in the case of a few 
institutions would cause a problem in the cal-
culation of the absorption ratio for the Hun-
garian banking and insurance data. Although 
daily data are not available, return values, for 
example the return on equity, can be calculat-
ed from accounting reports. The quantity of 
the return value calculated this way is, how-
ever, not sufficient to carry out the principal 
component analysis (the number of dates is 
lower than the number of variables in the da-
tabase). The application of multidimensional 
scaling may mean a solution from a method-
ological point of view, in which, with certain 
adjustments, it is possible to carry out calcula-
tions based on eigenvalue-eigenvector decom-
position. 
Multidimensional scaling is the compre-
hensive name of a variety of methods; one of 
them is metric scaling. There is a direct link 
between the results of principal component 
analysis, used in the calculation of the absorp-
tion ratio, and those of metric scaling in the 
case of the decomposition of the correlation 
matrix and the scaling of standardised euclid-
ean distances (Kovács, 2014, p. 226). Bécav-
in et al. (2011) also mentions that in certain 
cases the results of principal component anal-
ysis and multidimensional scaling may be the 
same. Based on this, in the following calcu-
lations we apply interval level measurement 
model for multidimensional scaling. similar-
ly to the analysis of Kritzman et al. (2011), the 
analysis is made on the basis of return data, 
and as Kritzman et al. (2011) considers the co-
variance matrix of returns as the starting point 
of the analysis, in the course of the multidi-
mensional scaling we do not standardise the 
return variables. Although this was not given 
an important role in the analysis of Kritzman 
et al. (2011), in this analysis we also examined 
the autocorrelation of returns, and the p-value 
corresponding to the Box-Ljung test was gen-
erally a relatively high value in the case of first-
order autocorrelations; it happened only in a 
few cases that the null hypothesis of the test 
was only acceptable at a significance level of 
0.1 percent. On this basis no return data were 
skipped in the analysis in order to avoid any 
potential autocorrelation problems. 
The values of the returns are calculated in 
the analysis as return on equity based on ac-
counting data (the return can be calculated by 
dividing the value of the earnings before taxes 
by the value of equity). The returns were calcu-
lated in the case of institutions that published 
balance sheet and profit and loss statement 
data in each year between 2003 and 2015, 
and where the average return calculated on the 
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basis of this period was not a negative value. 
The data included in the analysis represent a 
large part of the two sectors: within the con-
solidated balance sheet total in 2015 the total 
amount of the balance sheet totals of the in-
stitutions included in the analysis represented 
63.22 percent in the banking sector and 79.44 
percent in the insurance sector.
The point of multidimensional scaling in 
this analysis situation can be summarised by 
saying that based on the coordinates calcula-
ble in the space with the original number of 
dimensions, spatial coordinates with fewer di-
mensions can be calculated so that the origi-
nal and the ‘artificial’ spatial distance matrix 
be as similar as possible. The similarity can be 
measured by stRess indicator and the R-
squared indicator specific to the relation of the 
two types of distance values. if fitting is excel-
lent in the space with the given number of di-
mensions, it is worth interpreting the multidi-
mensional scaling spatial dimensions. in this 
analysis the multidimensional scaling dimen-
sions constitute the return dimensions, and it 
is a really interesting research question as to 
what extent the banking and insurance return 
dimensions are similar in an excellently fitting 
model. The number of dimensions in the ex-
cellently fitting model is also an interesting 
piece of data, which can be compared to what 
the number of the components (and the eigen-
values belonging to them) kept in the analysis 
would be in the principal component analysis. 
in multidimensional scaling models one of 
the indicators of fitting is the stRess (stand-
ardised Residual sum of squares) indicator 
whose value below 0.05 refers to good fitting 
(Kovács, 2014, p. 228). The adequacy of fit-
ting is also indicated by the R-squared indi-
cator calculable concerning the relation of the 
two types of distance value, in which case there 
is no specific value for the measurement of ex-
cellent fitting; the higher the R-squared indi-
cator, the better the alignment. The summary 
of the stRess and R-squared values meas-
ured (in the case of the different numbers of 
dimensions) based on the data of the 16 banks 
and 17 insurance corporations included in the 
analysis is contained in Table 1. 
From the stRess values included in ta-
ble 1, it can be concluded that the 3-dimen-
sion solution in the case of the banking sector 
can be considered as good, while in the case 
of the insurance sector, the good fitting of the 
model can be observed for the first time in the 
4-dimension solution. These results are simi-
lar to as if 3 or 4 components had been kept 
in a principal component analysis separately 
based on the 16 (banking) and 17 (insurance) 
variables. Of course, the number of the var-
Table 1
FiT indicaTors depending on The nUmber oF dimensions
indicators
number of dimensions
1 2 3 4 5
Bank, sTress 0.31869 0.07917 0.02933 0.01410 0.01118
Bank, R2 0.82155 0.98588 0.99696 0.99921 0.99950
insurer, sTress 0.33831 0.13333 0.07672 0.03401 0.02092
insurer, R2 0.70510 0.90263 0.95499 0.98929 0.99533
Source: own calculation based on www.mnb.hu
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iables included in the analysis may influence 
the result, but the difference is relatively mi-
nor between the 16 and 17 variables, and in 
the insurance sector, both indicators are slight-
ly more disadvantageous in the 4-dimension 
solution than in the 3-dimension solution in 
the banking sector (the R-squared value is low-
er and the stRess value is higher). Overall, 
based on the results of table 1, it can be con-
cluded that the returns move together to a less-
er extent in the insurance sector than in the 
banking sector, which means that the systemic 
risk of the insurance sector can be considered 
as slightly lower than that of the banking sec-
tor. The fitting indicators calculated in the two 
sectors can be compared in Figures 3/a and 3/b; 
these two figures also suggest the slightly lower 
systemic risk of the insurance sector. 
Based on the results, in the case of the 16 
banking return variables, the 3-dimension 
scaling model is well-fitting, which suggests 
the relatively great comovement of returns, 
similarly to the 4-dimension model of the in-
surance sector. The different types of system-
ic risk (cyclical and structural) may, theoreti-
cally, result in the comovement of returns; due 
to, for example, the asset price bubbles cate-
gorised by the MNB (2018a) into the catego-
ry of cyclical systemic risk types, the returns of 
banks providing lending relating to real estates 
of similar type may change similarly to each 
other. exposure concentration can be clas-
sified into the category of structural system-
ic risks, for example, if the lending activity of 
certain banks does not differ greatly in terms 
of customer type (MNB, 2018a), it may also 
result in a similar trend in the institution-level 
return indicators. 
Coordinate data belonging to return dimen-
sions are available in the well-fitting banking 
and insurance models, in the case of which the 
value of the correlation coefficient is theoreti-
cally zero, because they can correspond to the 
eigenvectors (similarly to the ‘artificial’ vari-
ables calculable in the principal component 
analysis). The (Pearson type) correlation co-
efficients calculable among the return dimen-
sions of the banking and insurance sector are 
not necessarily zero, and their values may show 
the similarity of the ‘factors’ influencing the re-
turns of the two sectors; these values of correla-
tion coefficients are contained in Table 2. 
in multidimensional scaling each dimen-
sion follows each other in order of ‘impor-
tance’, which means, for example, that along 
the first dimension, the difference of the max-
imum and minimum value is greater than 
along the second dimension. taking this into 
consideration, we can state that the dimension 
which can be considered as the most impor-
tant one in the banking sector slightly corre-
lates with the fourth dimension in the insur-
ance sector (and the value of the correlation 
cannot be considered as different from zero at 
a significance level of 5 percent). This result 
may indicate the differences of the banking 
and the insurance sector; based on table 2, the 
dimension ‘explaining’ the banking returns 
the most does not have a significant influence 
on the returns of the insurance sector. How-
ever, the second most important dimension 
in the banking and the insurance sector corre-
lates significantly. The name of this dimension 
(for example, based on which economic factor 
this dimension correlates with) could be the 
subject of a separate analysis, we do not discuss 
this issue in this analysis for reasons of space. 
The third dimension in the banking sector sig-
nificantly correlates with the first dimension of 
the insurance sector, too (the sign of the cor-
relation coefficient does not need to be inter-
preted in this case, because the sign of the ei-
genvectors belonging to the dimensions is 
optional), which suggests that the two sectors 
are similar to a certain extent. On the whole, 
the results suggest that the returns of the bank-
ing and the insurance sector evolve under the 
impact of partly different factors, and as a re-
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Figure 3/a
sTress indicaTors depending on The nUmber oF dimensions
Source: own calculations based on www.mnb.hu
Figure 3/b
r2 indicaTors depending on The nUmber oF dimensions
Source: own calculations based on www.mnb.hu
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sult, there is a minor difference between the 
systemic risk relating to return comovement 
posed by the two sectors. 
summary
The systemic risk assessment relating to finan-
cial institutions have been given greater and 
greater attention over the last years. in this 
process, the operation of insurance corpora-
tions and other financial institutions in ad-
dition to banks are also given increasing at-
tention. This study primarily would like to 
contribute to the literature by comparing the 
systemic risk of the Hungarian banking and 
insurance sector. 
systemic risk can be measured in a variety 
of ways, and in this study we discussed a meth-
od that relates to the measurement of the co-
movement of returns. The multidimensional 
scaling method used in the study is similar to 
the principal component analysis applied for 
the calculation of the indicator referred to as 
absorption ratio; however, it is more adequate 
for the analysis of the available data from a 
methodological point of view. No stock-mar-
ket return data are available on a large part of 
the institutions of the Hungarian banking and 
insurance sector, but returns can be calculated 
for each institution of the sectors from the bal-
ance sheet and profit and loss statement pub-
lished annually. With a few exceptions, the 
study includes the return on equity data of 
each bank and insurance corporation between 
2003 and 2015, based on which the most im-
portant return dimensions can be separated 
and compared across the sectors. The fit data 
of the solutions with different numbers of di-
mensions can be interpreted in a manner sim-
ilar to the absorption ratio spread in the liter-
ature as a systemic risk indicator. Based on the 
results, it can be concluded that the system-
ic risk of the insurance sector relating to re-
turn comovement is slightly lower than that of 
the banking sector. The difference of the bank-
ing and the insurance sector is also indicted 
by the fact that from the return dimensions 
the dimension with the greatest significance in 
the banking sector only correlates with the di-
mension that is the fourth most important one 
for the insurance corporations. The certain de-
gree of similarity between the two sectors is 
shown by the fact that the relation of the val-
ues belonging to the second dimension (sec-
ond banking and insurance dimension) can 
be considered as significant. Overall, the re-
sults of the study are similar to the view stat-
Table 2
correlaTion coeFFicienTs in The case oF dimensions
 ins1 ins2 ins3 ins4
Bank1 0.155 –0.143 0.451 –0.537
(0.614) (0.642) (0.122) (0.059)
Bank2 –0.306 0.849 0.114 0.169
(0.310) (0.000) (0.710) (0.581)
Bank3 –0.763 –0.172 –0.096 –0.342
(0.002) (0.574) (0.754) (0.253)
Source: own calculation based on www.mnb.hu (p-values in brackets)
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ed in the literature that suggests that the sourc-
es of the banking and insurance systemic risk 
are partly different, and accordingly, the insur-
ance systemic risk can be seen as lower than 
that of the banking sector. 
With regard to the results, it is important 
to underline that the study includes a meth-
odological approach that is similar to only one 
of the possible systemic risk indicators, so the 
conclusions might theoretically be different 
when the calculation of systemic risk is made 
by a different approach. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to note that a wide range of data is 
only available from the data of accounting re-
ports in the case of Hungarian banks and in-
surance corporations, so the results cannot be 
directly compared with other studies which 
made calculations with daily returns calculat-
ed on the basis of stock exchange quotations. 
Having said that, the results of the study strive 
to describe the whole banking and insurance 
sector as far as possible, and as a result of the 
uniform methodological approach, the com-
parison of the two sectors is feasible. A fur-
ther direction for the studies on this topic may 
be constituted by the definition of other re-
turn indicators from the available data, and 
the comparison of the results calculated by the 
same methodology, on the basis of different re-
turn indicators. 
Note
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